Since the time of Hume and Maine de Biran there have been two dominant views concerning our experience or perception of causality: Humians maintain that there is no direct experience of a causal link between successive events, while followers of Maine de Biran have argued that there is an internal experience of causality. By devising a series of ingenious experiments, Michotte attempts to show that both traditions are mistaken, and that there are causal impressions in the realm of external experience. (...) Whether or not one agrees with Michotte's conclusions, this study does effectively show the relevance of experimental data to an understanding of the perception of causality. There is a forward by R. C. Oldfield, several appendices bringing the research up to date, and a helpful commentary by T. R. Miles.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Hawthorne and Magidor's criticisms of the model of presupposition and assertion that I have used and defended are all based on a rejection of some transparency or introspection of assumptions about speaker presupposition. This response to those criticisms aims first to clarify, and then to defend, the required transparency assumptions. It is argued, first, that if the assumptions are properly understood, some prima facie problems for them do not apply, second, that rejecting the assumptions has intuitively implausible consequences, and third, (...) that the 'margin of error' argument against the principle of positive introspection has a false premiss. The paper concludes with a response to a criticism of what Hawthorne and Magidor call 'the uniformity principle' that is used in the model to explain some pragmatic phenomena. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett and others have suggested that qualia and introspectible phenomena do not exist. Dennett's account of consciousness, along with several related approaches, has been called illusionism by Keith Frankish. Frankish's analysis is helpful and provocative. As currently presented, however, his 'strong' version of illusionism suffers from several basic confusions, particularly regarding its relationship to eliminative materialism. This paper contrasts strong illusionism with an alternative that is easier to understand and more sharply focused -- fallibilist experiential realism, or, less technically, (...) modest realism. Fallibilist realism affirms the existence of experiential states that are commonly considered qualitative and phenomenal, but shares Frankish's agenda of thoroughly re-evaluating our judgments about such experiences. To illustrate the advantages of modest realism, I compare the ways illusionism and modest realism address two challenging puzzles: explaining how qualitative differences among sensory experiences could be constituted by differences among neural states, and explaining how neural states could constitute any conscious experiences whatsoever. (shrink)

Advances in transplantation have extended the life and relieved the suffering of thousands of individuals. The prospect of being able to use tissues from embryos, as well as from anencephalic newborns, offers the promise of further relief of suffering. However, these possibilities raise significant moral and public policy issues. The question arises of the extent to which those who disapprove of abortion may make use of tissues derived from abortion in order to treat serious diseases. This essay argues that, with (...) proper safeguards, such tissue can be used without cooperating in abortion. That is, even those who oppose abortion can benefit from the use of tissue procured during abortion. Questions also arise regarding the probity of maintaining a pregnancy in order to produce an anencephalic newborn whose biological existence will be maintained so as better to secure organs once death is declared. It is argued that, since no harm can be done to a being that has neither a sense of self or the capacity to feel pain, and since women have a right to forego abortions, there is no legitimate ground for opposing women's seeking meaning in their pregnancy through maximizing the opportunity of others to use the organs of their anencephalic newborn once death has been declared. Finally, it is argued that, since the capacities for sentience, a minimal condition for personhood, are never realized by an anencephalic, the entity has never been alive as a person. Therefore, there should be no opposition in principle to aborting anencephalics nor, after proper declaration, to making their organs available as one would after whole-brain death, despite the continued functioning of the brain stem. (shrink)

The Book Focuses On Meaning And Linguistic Representations , And Links Them To Propose A Representational Theory Of Meaning. It Shows That Meaning As Truth-Conditions And As Justification-Conditions Are Equally Rooted In The Semantic Space Of Language-Use.

Contributed articles presented at the National Seminar on Language and Mind held at Hyderabad in 2004.

Papers presented at a seminar held in 2011 organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad.

In the beginning of 1906 Professor S. A. Naber devoted a long paper in Mnemosyne to emendations and remarks upon Apollonius Rhodius. The Professor, following Buttmann, is of opinion that Apollonius was an ignorant imitator of Homer and rebukes him for the introduction of many ‘barbarous forms.’ This opinion, however, though it may contain some truth, is the result of much exaggeration, for Apollonius imitated Homer as a rival rather than as a servile flatterer, and naturally and deliberately introduced many (...) late forms into his Epic poem. I have no wish to deny that the Professor's paper contains acute and learned remarks, but certainly it does not show that familiarity with his author which might have been expected from so eminent a scholar. For instance, where a particular form is objected to for any reason, it is of no use to propose an emendation for one passage only in which it occurs and to leave other passages unnoticed. (shrink)

Govind Chandra Pande, b. 1923, Indian philosopher and historian; contributed articles.